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†
 
  INTRODUCTION   
As levels of criminal punishment have risen in the United 
States, more and more citizens now face the collateral conse-
quences of arrest and conviction. Such consequences are wide-
ranging, placing limits on everything from occupational licen-
sure to eligibility for public assistance to voting rights. This ar-
ticle brings a specific focus to how these restrictions affect non-
incarcerated felons—those living in their home communities as 
they complete a term of probation or parole. Although the legal 
and informal restrictions are separable for analytic purposes, 
we will demonstrate that people experience them in combina-
tion—as a pile of hopelessly tangled problems. While there has 
been great recent interest in the collateral effects of imprison-
ment, far less attention has been devoted to collateral conse-
quences during and after these periods of community supervi-
sion.
1
  
Many such restrictions are surely merited. Few would ar-
gue against limiting the gun rights of those convicted of drive-
 
†  Christopher Uggen is Distinguished McKnight Professor of Sociology, 
University of Minnesota; Robert Stewart is a sociology Ph.D. student and Na-
tional Science Foundation Graduate Fellow at the University of Minnesota. 
This Article represents their views and not National Science Foundation posi-
tions or policy. The authors thank Lindsay Blahnik for assistance in preparing 
this article and Emily Baxter and Levi Lachappelle for thoughtful comments 
on an earlier draft. Copyright © 2015 by Christopher Uggen & Robert Stewart.  
 1. See generally MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 
(2013); INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS 
IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind, eds., 2002); Alec Ewald & 
Christopher Uggen, The Collateral Effects of Imprisonment on Prisoners, Their 
Families, and Communities, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING & 
CORRECTIONS 83 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012); Margaret Col-
gate Love, Collateral Consequences After Padilla v. Kentucky: From Punish-
ment to Regulation, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 87 (2011). 
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by shootings or restricting access to children among those who 
have assaulted preschoolers. Yet collateral consequences are 
typically applied more universally (e.g., to all people convicted 
of felony-level offenses) rather than being tailored to particular 
offenses or individuals. While surveying the combined effects of 
collateral sanctions on probationers and parolees, the term “pil-
ing on” came immediately to mind. In American football, “piling 
on” occurs when one or more players jumps on top of a downed 
player after a tackle has been made.
2
 It is illegal because it is 
unnecessary, slows the progress of the game, and often results 
in serious injury. 
To that end, the evidence is mounting that at least some 
collateral sanctions are, in effect, experienced as a form of pil-
ing on and, hence, impeding successful completion of communi-
ty supervision and compromising rather than enhancing public 
safety. Articles in the national media, reports from the Ameri-
can Bar Association and the Uniform Law Commission, federal 
legislation such as the Second Chance Act of 2007, and public 
hearings across the states are now squarely addressing the 
challenge of community reintegration—and the barriers posed 
by formal and informal collateral consequences.
3
 For example, 
Democrat Cory Booker of New Jersey and Republican Rand 
Paul of Kentucky recently introduced the REDEEM Act in the 
U.S. Senate, a broad-based reform effort that would ease 
expungement procedures and reduce collateral sanctions such 
as bans on food stamps and public assistance for people con-
victed of drug crimes.
4
  
With the rapid growth of all correctional populations over 
the past four decades, such efforts have taken on greater mean-
ing for attorneys, researchers, policy makers, and, most im-
portantly, people convicted of criminal offenses. As shown in 
Figure 1, nearly seven in ten of those under correctional super-
vision in 2011 were not incarcerated but were instead super-
vised in their communities on probation or parole.
5
 Moreover, 
even as correctional populations have risen, there has been a 
tremendous revolution in scientific knowledge about crime over 
the life course. We now have clear evidence that the over-
 
 2. Roger Goodell, NFL, Official Rules of the NFL r. 12.2.6(d) (2013), 
http://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/image/rulebook/pdfs/2013%20-% 
20Rule%20Book.pdf.  
 3. See infra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
 4. See S. 2567, 113th Cong. § 3 (2014), available at https://www.congress 
.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/2567/text. 
 5. See infra Figure 1. 
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whelming majority of people convicted of crimes will eventually 
desist from criminal behavior.
6
 Yet our law, policy, and public 
discourse have lagged far behind this revolution in scientific 
knowledge. We continue to proceed as though criminality crys-
tallizes or inheres in individuals, such that many collateral 
consequences are imposed indefinitely, if not permanently.
7
 In 
this article we consider the balance of interests involved in tal-
lying the costs and benefits of imposing various collateral sanc-
tions.  
 Figure 1. Rising U.S. correctional populations, 1980–2011.
8
 
 
 
 
 6. See JOHN H. LAUB & ROBERT J. SAMPSON, SHARED BEGINNINGS, 
DIVERGENT LIVES: DELINQUENT BOYS TO AGE 70, at 275–93 (2013). 
 7. See Christopher Uggen & Lindsay Blahnik, The Increasing Stickiness 
of Public Labels 2 (Nov. 30, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with au-
thor). 
 8. The source statistics for this figure are taken from the following U.S. 
Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics annual publications from 
1980 to 2011. See generally LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERIKA PARKS, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
2011 (2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus11.pdf; 
LAURA M. MARUSCHAK & ERIKA PARKS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011 (2014), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus11.pdf; TODD D. MINTON, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2011—STATISTICAL TABLES 
(2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim11st.pdf. 
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We will also discuss how a second revolution has magnified 
the effect of collateral sanctions. New and disruptive infor-
mation technologies now make criminal records more accessible 
and consequential, blurring the boundaries between public and 
private information. We now know more about one another 
than ever before, such that criminal labels are increasingly 
sticky and consequential—and virtually impossible to “‘peel off,’ 
dissolve, or remove.”
9
 A criminal record check once required a 
visit to the courthouse and the better part of an afternoon. To-
day, it only takes a few seconds to order up a comprehensive 
criminal history from our phones or computers. And landlords, 
employers, and curious friends and acquaintances are increas-
ingly availing themselves of this information. 
This Article assembles a diverse range of evidence to sur-
vey this landscape of “invisible punishments” and community 
supervision. Part I describes the consequences of involvement 
with the criminal justice system and their effect on probation-
ers and parolees in the United States. We here enumerate the-
se consequences and review their impact on those being super-
vised—including prospects for employment, education, and 
social integration. We then conclude in Part II by sketching 
some reform proposals to assist policy makers in distinguishing 
necessary and useful collateral consequences from those that 
appear to do more harm than good.  
I.  CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION   
People convicted of crime are subject to a growing list of 
federal, state, and local restrictions affecting their economic, 
political, and social activities.
10
 These are often termed “collat-
eral consequences” because they are typically located outside 
the penal code, implemented by non-criminal justice institu-
tions, and interpreted by the courts as civil regulations rather 
than criminal penalties.
11
 Both the American Bar Association 
 
 9. See Uggen & Blahnik, supra note 7, at 2. 
 10. See generally Ewald & Uggen, supra note 1. 
 11. See generally INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note 1, at 26 (“The agen-
cies that administer these sanctions are far-flung[] [and] have little or no con-
nection with the criminal justice system.”); Velmer S. Burton et al., The Col-
lateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A National Study of State 
Statutes, 51 FED. PROBATION 52, 52 (1987) (“[C]ollateral consequences . . . re-
fer[s] to the rights or privileges that are lost upon convicting as mandated by 
state and Federal statutes.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Michael 
Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal 
Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 
86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 634–35 & nn.60–61 (2006). 
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(ABA) and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws (NCCUSL) have called attention to the expan-
sion of federal and state collateral sanctions in the past two 
decades.
12
 Following the ABA, the Court Security Improvement 
Act of 2007 further distinguishes between collateral “sanctions” 
(restrictions imposed automatically upon conviction) and “dis-
qualifications” (other penalties a court, agency, or official is au-
thorized but not required to impose).
13
 This distinction is not 
yet in wide use, though it is important for both policy and ana-
lytic purposes. 
Although they are often associated with felony convictions, 
collateral sanctions affect individuals at earlier and later stages 
of criminal justice processing and pertain to non-felony offenses 
(e.g., misdemeanors) as well. At the pre-conviction stage, par-
ents can lose custody of their children immediately when police 
find drugs in a home; similarly, many employers suspend 
workers without pay when they are arrested or charged with 
crimes, regardless of whether they are later convicted.
14
 Under 
New York City’s Narcotics Eviction Program, even the issuance 
of a search warrant may be sufficient to trigger eviction from 
private or public housing.
15
 The imposition of such sanctions 
varies dramatically across municipalities, but it is no exaggera-
tion to suggest that each of the 12.2 million U.S. arrests each 
year could trigger some form of collateral sanction.
16
 Of those 
who are charged and convicted, misdemeanants as well as fel-
ons are often subject to such consequences. For example, 
noncitizen residents convicted of misdemeanors may face de-
portation.
17
 
In light of the enormous scope and reach of collateral sanc-
 
 12. Norman K. Maleng et al., ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Collat-
eral Sanctions, and Discretionary Disqualification of Convicted Persons, 2004 
A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. SEC. [hereinafter Maleng]; NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, AMENDMENTS TO UNIFORM COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT (July 9–16, 2010), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/collateral_consequences/uccca_final_ 
10.pdf. 
 13. See Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–77, 
§ 510(d)(1)–(3), 121 Stat. 2534, 2544 (2008).  
 14. See Ewald & Uggen, supra note 1, at 85. 
 15. See Scott Duffield Levy, The Collateral Consequences of Seeking Order 
Through Disorder: New York’s Narcotics Eviction Program, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 539, 544–54 (2008). 
 16. Crime in the United States 2012, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/ 
cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/persons-arrested/persons-
arrested (last visited Mar. 31, 2015). 
 17. See Nina Bernstein, How One Marijuana Cigarette May Lead to De-
portation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2010, at A17. 
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tions, it is difficult to provide a comprehensive overview of their 
impact. We will therefore focus directly on sanctions that are 
most salient for those under community supervision. As of De-
cember 31, 2012, nearly 4.8 million people, or one in fifty U.S. 
adults, were serving a community supervision sentence.
18
 This 
includes over 850,000 parolees and over 3.94 million probation-
ers.
19
 Because the full weight of collateral sanctions falls most 
heavily on those convicted of felonies, we will focus primarily 
on this group in our review. Approximately 3 million people are 
currently serving time in their communities for felonies (this 
includes almost all of the parolees, and 2.1 million felony pro-
bationers).
20
 We next catalog the individually separable eco-
nomic, social, physical, and civic consequences of felony convic-
tion. Throughout, however, we will return to the metaphor of 
“piling on,” as we cite research literature, personal stories, and 
interview data. Taken together, this evidence will demonstrate 
how the total weight of collateral sanctions far exceeds their 
individual impact.  
A. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 
Any interaction with the criminal justice system, including 
a single arrest,
21
 can have long-term repercussions on one’s 
economic future. A criminal record creates both formal and in-
formal barriers that restrict or limit career and educational op-
portunities, prohibit certain forms of economic assistance, and 
significantly reduce lifetime earnings.
22
  
1. Employment 
Criminologists have long recognized that employment 
plays a key role in promoting desistance from crime,
23
 or the 
 
 18. LAURA M. MARUSCHAK & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012, at 1 (Jan. 
1, 2015), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus12.pdf. 
 19. See id. 
 20. See id. at 6. 
 21. See Christopher Uggen, Mike Vuolo, Sarah Lageson, Ebony Ruhland 
& Hilary K. Whitham, The Edge of Stigma: An Experimental Audit of the Ef-
fects of Low-Level Criminal Records on Employment, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 627, 
628 (2014). 
 22. See Sara Wakefield & Christopher Uggen, Incarceration and Stratifi-
cation, 36 ANN. REV. SOC. 387, 393–96 (2010); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE 
GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES 233–60 (Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western & Steve Redburn eds., 
2014). 
 23. See, e.g., John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson, Understanding De-
sistance from Crime, 28 CRIME & JUST. 1, 17 (2001) (“[O]ffenders are charac-
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continued cessation of criminal behavior. Indeed, politicians 
and criminal justice officials have pointed to the benefits of 
steady employment as essential, both for putting distance be-
tween current and past behavior and as a potential avenue out 
of poverty.
24
 
Paradoxically, though, a criminal past erects informal bar-
riers that prevent individuals from finding jobs in the short-
term and, by extension, careers in the long-term. Hiring exper-
iments conclusively demonstrate that a felony prison record 
significantly decreases the rate of positive employer responses 
or “callbacks.”
25
 For example, one study found that a felony 
conviction reduced the callback rate by half for white male ap-
plicants and nearly two-thirds for African American male ap-
plicants.
26
 Our own later study probed the limits of such stigma 
by testing the effect of a single three-year-old misdemeanor ar-
rest.
27
 We sent matched pairs of young men to apply for 300 en-
try-level jobs in Minnesota, assigning one member of the pair a 
three-year-old disorderly conduct arrest. Figure 2 shows the re-
sults for our White and African American pairs in the no-arrest 
(control) and arrest (treatment) conditions.  
 
terized by . . . unstable employment.”). 
 24. Text of President Bush’s 2004 State of the Union Address, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 20, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/transcripts/ 
bushtext_012004.html [hereinafter Bush State of the Union] (noting that re-
leased prisoners unable to “find work or a home or help, they are much more 
likely to commit crime and return to prison”); 1996 State of the Union Address, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 1996), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp 
-srv/politics/special/states/docs/sou96.htm [hereinafter Clinton State of the Un-
ion] (outlining programs that “encourage people to move from welfare to 
work”); Christopher Uggen & Jeremy Staff, Work As a Turning Point for Crim-
inal Offenders, 5 CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q. 1, 3 (2001). 
 25. See Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 
937, 947 (2003) [hereinafter Pager, The Mark]; DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, 
CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION 58 (2007) 
[hereinafter PAGER, MARKED]. 
 26. See Pager, The Mark, supra note 25, at 958. 
 27. See generally Uggen et al., supra note 21. 
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Figure 2. Effect of a single misdemeanor arrest on employ-
er callbacks, by race 
 
 
We found a four-percentage point difference between the 
arrest and no-arrest groups in the rate of positive “callbacks” 
by employers. Even a minor arrest record thus causes about a 
15% reduction in the likelihood of callback for African Ameri-
cans and a 10% reduction for Whites.
28
 For those under super-
vision for felonies, of course, the effect is much greater. 
These findings are echoed by the stories applicants tell 
about their job search experiences. When we interviewed peo-
ple released from prison as part of the Minnesota Exits and En-
tries Project, some told us that they did not disclose the record. 
One said, “I won’t even put it down . . . . You know, first im-
pression is everything.” When asked why not, he responded 
bluntly, “If you check that box, they’re not going to hire you! 
They’re going to be like, [h]e’s a felon! He might steal; he might 
 
 28. Id. The effect of the treatment is calculated by dividing the percentage 
difference between callback rates of the control and treatment conditions for 
each race by the callback rate of control condition. See id. at 637–39. For ex-
ample, the difference in callback rates for the African American male testers 
was 4% (27.5% – 23.5% = 4%). This amounts to an effective reduction in 
callbacks for African American males of 14.5% (4 / 27.5 = 14.5%). For our 
White testers, the treatment condition resulted in an approximately 10% re-
duction in callbacks (4 / 38.8 = 10.3%). 
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rob us, you know, all the bad things!”
29
 
On the other hand, many told us that being truthful about 
their criminal justice experience was the best approach, partic-
ularly since so much information is now so easily available. As 
one person explained, “they can just check up [sic] online, 
too . . . . You can find anything on the web. You type in some-
body’s name, their whole entire profile comes up . . . . [T]here’s 
no use in lying.”
30
 In other words, not only do people with rec-
ords encounter criminal history questions on job applications, 
but they also confront the ubiquitous availability of online 
criminal records.
31
  
In recent years, the “ban the box” reform movement has 
gained traction in reducing discrimination on the basis of such 
records. Ban the box policies prohibit employers from asking 
about criminal records on the initial application.
32
 As of this 
writing, thirteen states, more than sixty municipalities, and 
major firms such as Target Corporation had enacted ban-the-
box—many within the past five years.
33
 While researchers have 
just begun to assess the effectiveness of these new policies, 
their impact may be modest within the current context of 
online criminal record availability. Here, as elsewhere, a single 
legal change is unlikely to exert a large impact unless it is sup-
ported by a much broader transformation in privacy rights and 
expectations.
34
 
Apart from this informal discrimination in hiring, people 
with records also face formal jurisdiction-specific barriers in 
the many fields that require occupational licensing and other 
 
 29. Interview by Shelly Schaefer with Participant in the Minn. Exits & 
Entries Project (May 15, 2008) (on file with author). The Minnesota Exits and 
Entries Project is a comparative study of reentry from different types of insti-
tutions. See Tim Brady, Exits, 3 FACETS 2, 3–4 (2008), available at http:// 
www.soc.umn.edu/assets/pdf/FacetsMay2008.pdf. 
 30. Interview by Arturo Baiocchi with Participant in the Minn. Exits & 
Entries Project (2008) (on file with author). 
 31. See Sarah Esther Lageson et al., Legal Ambiguity in Managerial As-
sessments of Criminal Records, 40 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 175, 176 (2015). 
 32. See NAT’L EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, SEIZING THE “BAN THE BOX” 
MOMENTUM TO ADVANCE A NEW GENERATION OF FAIR CHANCE HIRING 
REFORMS 2 (2014), available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/SCLP/2014/ 
Seizing-Ban-the-Box-Momentum-Advance-New-Generation-Fair-Chance-
Hiring-Reforms.pdf. 
 33. Id. at 3–4. As of this writing, these states include California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Rhode Island. See id. 
 34. See, e.g., PAGER, MARKED, supra note 25, at 157 (explaining that seal-
ing and expungement will be ineffective without careful oversight of credit re-
porting agencies and criminal background services). 
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heavily regulated sectors. Several blanket policies on the state 
and federal levels prohibit some or all people with felonies from 
being licensed or permitted to work in certain occupations and 
sectors.
35
 These include occupations in industries ranging from 
the public sector,
36
 law, real estate,
37
 air transportation,
38
 race-
tracks,
39
 and any position in which an individual has “responsi-
bility for the safety and well-being of children, the elderly, or 
individuals with disabilities.”
40
 
Occupations with licensing criteria that do not explicitly 
prohibit current or former felons often require a “good charac-
ter” test. As Bruce May points out, character is ambiguous and 
difficult to define legislatively; lacking a clear definition, licens-
ing agencies and courts have come to accept a prior criminal 
conviction as evidence of “bad character.”
41
 
The American Bar Association’s helpful national inventory, 
supported in part by the National Institute of Justice, provides 
much-needed basic information on federal—and state-specific 
employment consequences.
42
 This site distinguishes between 
discretionary restrictions and those that are mandatory or au-
tomatic, as well as the duration over which particular re-
strictions are imposed. State-specific websites, such as Ohio’s 
CIVICC (Civil Impact of Criminal Convictions) and the list 
maintained by the Texas State Law Library, are increasingly 
aggregating and publishing such details online.
43
 For example, 
 
 35. See Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: Towards a 
Constitutional Framework for Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting 
People with Criminal Records, 7 J.L. SOC’Y 18, 23 (2005). 
 36. See Karol Lucken & Lucille M. Ponte, A Just Measure of Forgiveness: 
Reforming Occupational Licensing Regulations for Ex-Offenders Using BFOQ 
Analysis, 30 L. & POL’Y 46, 47 (2008). 
 37. See Bruce E. May, The Character Component of Occupational Licens-
ing Laws: A Continuing Barrier to the Ex-Felon’s Employment Opportunities, 
71 N.D. L. REV. 187, 191 (1995). 
 38. 49 U.S.C. § 44936(B) (2012). 
 39. MINN. STAT. § 240.08 (2014).  
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 5119a(a)(1) (2012). 
 41. See May, supra note 37, at 195. May also discusses what he considers 
to be less restrictive character tests, such as “honest and trustworthy” and 
“reputable character.” Id. at 200–02. He argues that these statutes “present a 
less demanding standard to the ex-felon because they allow somewhat for the 
amelioration of the past felonious wrong through subsequent good conduct 
and/or the rehabilitation of the ex-felon.” Id. at 200. 
 42. See generally Am. Bar Ass’n, National Inventory of the Collateral Con-
sequences of Conviction, NICCC, http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2015) (interactive database). 
 43. See generally Civil Impact of Criminal Convictions Under Ohio Law, 
CIVICC, [hereinafter CIVICC], http://civiccohio.org (last visited Mar. 31, 2015) 
(interactive database); Felony Restrictions by Profession/Business License, 
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Texas requires a test of good moral character for professionals 
such as marriage and family counselors, while excluding all 
convicted felons from positions as labor organizers.
44
 Similarly, 
massage therapists are ineligible for a license if they have been 
convicted of a “misdemeanor involving moral turpitude” or a 
felony within the preceding five years.
45
 Some occupational li-
censes in Texas may be revoked following a felony conviction, 
including those of licensed accountants, architects, and nurs-
es.
46
 Applicants confronting these “good character” statutes may 
argue their case and they may have the opportunity to appeal 
adverse decisions.
47
 At best, however, such appeal procedures 
can only offer a precarious, daunting, and time-consuming path 
to licensure. 
Of course, an occupational license cannot guarantee a job, 
nor can it insulate jobseekers from informal discrimination. Be-
cause conviction status is not recognized as a protected status, 
most non-contract workers face an indefinite threat of being 
fired solely on the basis of their criminal records. In 2012, the 
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued a 
lengthy enforcement guidance document designed to clarify 
standards and provide “best practices” on how employers may 
address criminal backgrounds without violating prohibitions 
against employment discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act.
48
 
The guidance instructs employers to assess criminal rec-
ords on an individualized basis, considering such factors as the 
nature of the crime, the time since it was committed, and the 
nature of the job. As of this writing, the extent to which these 
policies have been adopted or enforced remains unclear.  
In the abstract and in isolation, these barriers may appear 
surmountable. But people subject to employment restrictions 
rarely experience them only once and in isolation. It is much 
more common that collateral consequences pile one atop the 
 
TEX. ST. L. LIBR., http://www.sll.texas.gov/library-resources/collections/ statu-
tory-restrictions-on-convicted-felons/profession (last updated Feb. 20, 2014) 
[hereinafter TSLL]. 
 44. See TSLL, supra note 43 (“Marriage and Family Therapist” and “La-
bor Union Officer or Organizer”). 
 45. Id. (“Massage Therapist”). 
 46. Id. (“Accountant,” “Architect,” “Nurse Aide,” and “Nursing Facility 
Administrator”). 
 47. See id. (“Dyslexia Practitioner and Therapist”). 
 48. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CONSIDERATION OF ARREST 
AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at VIII (2012), available at http://www 
.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arrest_conviction.cfm. 
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other. We spoke with Michael, a married ex-felon with a two-
year-old son, who explained this “piling on” phenomenon.
49
 Af-
ter serving over a year in prison for a felony driving while in-
toxicated conviction, Michael enrolled at a private college in 
Minnesota.
50
 In less than four years, he earned a degree in so-
cial work, graduating with honors.
51
 Following graduation, he 
faced licensing restrictions because of his felony record.
52
 He 
passed the required examination and then petitioned the Board 
to consider his case.
53
 He provided several letters of recommen-
dation and support, as well as a lengthy account of his past 
mistakes and his present state. After several months and mul-
tiple appearances before the Board, he was eventually granted 
a license to practice social work in Minnesota.
54
 
His difficulties, though, did not end there. He applied for 
several open positions throughout the state but was consistent-
ly rejected.
55
 After several months, he finally found a job in a 
small town.
56
 He and his young family packed up and moved 
across the state using most of their savings, and things were 
going well at first.
57
 He was excited, he said, because “[y]ou 
know I spent our savings to get up here because it was a chance 
at a real career.”
58
 But then, as he recalled the experience: 
After two months of working, I get pulled into the office by the direc-
tor and my supervisor. [They said,] “Well you are great at what you 
do and a fantastic social worker, but we don’t think it’s a good fit here 
because of your past.” So they gave me the option of being terminated 
or to resign.
59
 
When asked why now and not earlier, he told us, “[t]he 
county commissioners forced them to do that.”
60
 In other words, 
not only did his criminal record present an obstacle in the li-
censing process and the job search, it also came back to haunt 
him in spite of his good performance. As he summed it up: 
“[t]he worst part is getting looked [at] and told you are great at 
 
 49. Telephone Interview with Michael (Sept. 25, 2014). Michael is a pseu-
donym to protect his identity. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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what you do, but we don’t want you because of your record.”
61
 
2. Education 
Knowing the barriers that await them in the labor market, 
many people with records seek to improve their employability 
through education. For most people, investing in human capital 
makes good economic sense, as academic credentials are 
strongly associated with both employment and earnings. As the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics reported recently, those with a four 
year bachelor’s degree are almost half as likely to be unem-
ployed as those with only a high school diploma and, on aver-
age, they earn a salary that is roughly 1.7 times that of a high 
school graduate (and 2.3 times that of a high school dropout).
62
 
Since the 1970s, increasing demand for skilled workers in the 
United States has outpaced education levels among young 
males, further advantaging college educated jobseekers.
63
 
Our analysis of changes in college application forms, how-
ever, suggests that a growing number of admissions offices are 
now requiring applicants to disclose criminal history infor-
mation.
64
 Based on our preliminary interviews and extant re-
search, officials cite campus safety as the principal reason for 
requesting criminal history information, especially in the af-
termath of major on-campus incidents such as the 2007 Virgin-
ia Tech shooting and the murder of two students at the Univer-
sity of North Carolina.
65
 To date, there has been scant research 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Employment Projections, BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Mar. 24, 2014), 
http://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_chart_001.htm. In 2013, the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics estimated that 7.5% of individuals with only a high school diploma were 
unemployed, and the median weekly earnings for high school graduates who 
were employed were approximately $651. Id. For bachelor’s degree holders, 
the unemployment rate was 4% and weekly earnings for the employed were 
approximately $1,108. Id. Median weekly earnings for individuals who did not 
graduate from high school were estimated at $472. Id. Nevertheless, these da-
ta are for individuals age 25 and over and are full-time wage or salary work-
ers. Id. 
 63. David Autor, The Polarization of Job Opportunities in the U.S. Labor 
Market: Implications for Employment and Earnings, 23 CMTY. INVS. 11, 16 
(2011). 
 64. Robert Stewart, Requiring Criminal History Disclosures in the College 
Application Process, Address at the Law and Soc’y Meetings (May 31, 2014); 
see also CTR. FOR CMTY. ALTERNATIVES, THE USE OF CRIMINAL HISTORY IN 
COLLEGE ADMISSIONS: RECONSIDERED 7–22 (2010) [hereinafter CCA], availa-
ble at http://www.communityalternatives.org/pdf/Reconsidered-criminal-hist 
-recs-in-college-admissions.pdf (analyzing survey data on how colleges and 
universities use these questions in practice). 
 65. See Darby Dickerson, Background Checks in the University Admis-
sions Process: An Overview of Legal and Policy Considerations, 34 J.C. & U.L. 
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connecting campus crime to admission of students with crimi-
nal records, but the little research that exists suggests that 
such fears are likely overblown.
66 
 
As in the employment context, disclosing a criminal record 
at the application stage could disqualify an applicant outright 
or tip the scale on an application that could go either way. 
There has been too little research to estimate the magnitude of 
this effect. But a survey of admissions officials found that more 
than 90% viewed any felony conviction as particularly negative, 
and more than 75% felt the same way about any drug or alcohol 
offense.
67
 Our own interviews with admissions officials con-
firmed these findings. From their perspectives, no offenses 
were automatic disqualifiers; however, felonies, and especially 
violent crimes, were particularly concerning.
68
 In regard to su-
pervision status, some admissions officials we interviewed pre-
ferred applicants to have completed their probation or parole 
term before applying because it showed evidence of successful 
reintegration; others told us they preferred that applicants 
were still under supervision because it provided for another 
layer of accountability.
69
 
In most cases, applicants who disclose a criminal record 
are required to submit additional material for further scrutiny, 
 
419, 431–33 (2008); UNIV. OF N.C. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, TASK FORCE ON 
THE SAFETY OF THE CAMPUS COMMUNITY FINAL REPORT 3–5 (Dec. 14, 2004) 
[hereinafter UNC REPORT], available at http://counsel.cua.edu/ res/docs/final 
-safety-task-force-report.pdf; Matthew W. Pierce & Carol W. Runyan, Crimi-
nal Records and College Admissions, 16 INJURY PREVENTION 58, 58 (2010). 
 66. See, e.g., UNC REPORT, supra note 65, at 7. Screening out applicants 
with records is unlikely to have large effects on campus crime rates. A campus 
shooting on a University of North Carolina campus compelled the president of 
the university to create the Task Force on the Safety of the Campus Commu-
nity. Id. at i. This task force was commissioned to provide a thorough report on 
safety on the University of North Carolina campuses. Id. The seventeen-
member panel focused specifically on the pre-enrollment practices of the Uni-
versity of North Carolina’s system and campus security between 2001 and 
2004. Id. at 12. Over this period, the total number of students enrolled at Uni-
versity of North Carolina campuses was approximately 250,000, and 1086 
crimes were reported throughout the campus system. Id. at 4. Of the reported 
crimes within this timeframe, only twenty-one were suspected to have been 
committed by students with a prior criminal history and, of these, only eight 
had self-disclosed their criminal history on their applications. Id. at i–ii. In 
other words, less than 2% of all reported crimes within the campus system 
were committed by students with prior criminal histories. See also Carol W. 
Runyan et al., Can Student-Perpetuated College Crime Be Predicted Based on 
Precollege Misconduct?, 19 INJURY PREVENTION 405, 405–06 (2013) (investi-
gating lesser misconduct). 
 67. CCA, supra note 64, at 18. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Stewart, supra note 64. 
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often by an ad-hoc admissions committee. For example, at least 
one some New York public colleges require applicants with 
criminal records to request a copy of the personal and confiden-
tial version of their records to be sent directly to the college
70
 
from the State Division of Criminal Justice Services, even 
though state law prohibits sending these confidential reports to 
a third-party.
71
 Such requirements are thus literally impossible 
to legally satisfy, yet they continue in New York and elsewhere. 
More often, applicants are required to submit letters from 
themselves and/or criminal justice officials, sign releases for 
various types of private records, and provide evidence of reha-
bilitation or good conduct.
72
 Recent research focusing on the 
SUNY colleges has found that these additional requirements, 
which can be quite onerous, lead to many applicants with crim-
inal records leaving the application process through attrition.
73
 
While colleges may count these applicants as “incomplete” ra-
ther than rejected, they are, for all intents and purposes, tacit 
rejections.
74
 And, at an average cost of $41 per application, few 
people with criminal records can afford to apply to a large 
number of institutions.
75
 
Even if a current or former probationer or parolee success-
fully overcomes these barriers in the admissions process, they 
may be ineligible for federal financial aid. Everyone applying 
for federal financial aid must complete the Free Application for 
Federal Student Aid (FAFSA).
76
 Question 23 of the FAFSA form 
 
 70. CTR. FOR CMTY. ALTS, INC., BOXED OUT: CRIMINAL HISTORY 
SCREENING AND COLLEGE APPLICATION ATTRITUION 25 n.11 (2015), available 
at http://www.communityalternatives.org/pdf/publications/Boxed Out_Full Re-
port.pdf [hereinafter CTR. FOR CMTY. ALTS, INC., BOXED OUT]; Stewart, supra 
note 64. Supplemental Requirement Letter, Purchase College-State University 
of New York (on file with authors) (showing that applicants who acknowledge 
a felony record when applying to Purchase College, a member of the State 
University of New York system, are sent a standardized letter from the college 
that requires them to send a request to the Division of Criminal Justice Ser-
vices “ask that records be sent to me [the Director of Admissions]”). This issue 
is referenced in CTR. FOR CMTY. ALTS, INC., UNNECESSARY AND 
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE: SUNY’S CRIMINAL HISTORY SCREENING POLICY 2 
(2014) [hereinafter CTR. FOR CMTY. ALTS, INC., UNNECESSARY AND 
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE]. 
 71. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 6050.1 (2015). 
 72. CTR. FOR CMTY. ALTS., INC., BOXED OUT, supra note 70, at 23–33. 
 73. Id. at 49. 
 74. Stewart, supra note 64.  
 75. Delece Smith-Barrow, Colleges That Charge the Most for Applying, 
U.S. NEWS (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/ 
the-short-list-college/articles/2014/09/16/colleges-that-charge-the-most-for 
-applying. 
 76. Federal Student Aid, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (2014), https://studentaid 
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asks applicants, “Have you been convicted for the possession or 
sale of illegal drugs for an offense that occurred while you were 
receiving federal student aid (such as grants, loans or work-
study)?”
77
 Applicants who answer “yes” must then complete an 
additional form to determine whether they are currently eligi-
ble to apply for federal financial aid or whether they are subject 
to an ineligibility period before they can apply.
78
 Those with a 
single conviction for drug possession while receiving aid who 
have not completed a federally approved chemical dependency 
treatment program are ineligible to apply for financial aid for 
one year from the date of the conviction.
79
 Applicants with two 
drug possession convictions or one drug sales conviction are in-
eligible for two years from the date of the most recent convic-
tion. And individuals with three drug possession convictions or 
two drug sales convictions are ineligible until they successfully 
complete a chemical dependency treatment program.
80
 Note 
that the ineligibility periods begin at date of conviction and not 
date of offense, thereby leaving those sentenced to community 
supervision most exposed to these prohibitions. 
3. Assistance 
Apart from informal and formal barriers to work and 
schooling, people with criminal records also face limited access 
to public assistance. For example, when congress passed the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996, welfare reform imposed new formal restrictions on 
assistance for those with felony drug convictions.
81
  
 
.ed.gov/fafsa. 
 77. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FREE APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL STUDENT AID, 
3 (2014), available at https://studentaid.ed.gov/sites/default/files/2014-15-fafsa 
.pdf. This question had been broader in scope, applying to any prior drug con-
viction: “A student who has been convicted of any offense under any Federal or 
State law involving the possession or sale of a controlled substance shall not 
be eligible to receive . . . . ” It was amended as part of the Deficit Reduction Act 
of 2005 to read,  
A student who is convicted of any offense under any Federal or State 
law involving the possession or sale of a controlled substance for con-
duct that occurred during a period of enrollment for which the stu-
dent was receiving any grant, loan, or work assistance under this title 
shall not be eligible to receive . . . .  
Pub. L. No. 109–171, § 8021(c), 120 Stat. 178, 8021 (2005). 
 78. Student Aid Eligibility Worksheet, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (2014), https:// 
studentaid.ed.gov/sites/default/files/2014-15-student-aid-eligibility-drug 
-worksheet.pdf. 
 79. 20 U.S.C. § 1091 (r)(1) (2012). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
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With Melissa Thompson, we investigated whether this 
change, banning individuals with felony convictions from re-
ceiving aid, affected female arrest rates.
82
 Thompson and Uggen 
compared arrest rates of the states that chose to opt-out of the 
ban altogether (i.e., not banning drug felons from receiving as-
sistance) with states that only partially opted out and those 
that did not opt-out (i.e., banning drug felons from receiving as-
sistance). We found a significantly greater increase in female 
arrest rates in states that imposed the ban relative to those 
with a partial ban or no ban at all.
83
 Although it is difficult to 
make causal claims on the basis of these state-level data, a 
supplemental individual-level analysis of the National Longi-
tudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97) also showed less drug crime 
and property crime among female public assistance recipients 
during periods in which they received assistance.
84
 Taken to-
gether, such work suggests that the denial of benefits may have 
had the unintended consequence of increasing crime rates.  
Informally, the stigma of criminal records has also been in-
voked in punishing those who fail to disclose criminal convic-
tions. Take, for example, the case of Anita McLemore, a single 
mother of two teenagers, who was convicted of submitting a 
false claim for food assistance.
85
 McLemore had failed to dis-
close her felony drug convictions on assistance applications. 
She pled guilty to the charges and repaid the $4,367 in benefits 
she received. The federal sentencing guidelines suggested a 
sentence ranging from two to eight months, and the prosecu-
tion recommended the lower end of the guideline sentence. 
Nevertheless, U.S. District Court Judge Henry Wingate instead 
sentenced her to three years in prison. As he put it, “The de-
fendant’s criminal record is simply abominable.”
86
 Legal scholar 
Kaaryn Gustafson suggests that Ms. McLemore “was deemed 
criminal because she failed to declare herself a criminal on wel-
fare documents.”
87
 As Gustafson points out, even though 
 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104–193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 82. Melissa Thompson & Christopher Uggen, How Welfare Reform Drove 
Up Female Arrest Rates 3–5, (June 19, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with authors). 
 83. Id. at 11. 
 84. Id. at 16. 
 85. Matt Taibbi, Woman Gets Jail for Food-Stamp Fraud: Wall Street 
Fraudsters Get Bailouts, ROLLING STONE (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www 
.rollingstone.com/politics/news/woman-gets-jail-for-food-stamp-fraud-wall-
street-fraudsters-get-bailouts-20111117. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Kaaryn Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization 
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McLemore and her family were living in poverty during these 
years and would surely have qualified for state assistance had 
it not been for her drug convictions, this was never considered 
as a factor in the case.
88
 Instead, her criminal record appears to 
have superseded all other factors in her sentencing.
89
 
B. SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES  
Apart from their economic impact, a history of criminal 
convictions has far-reaching social effects. These are felt most 
keenly in intimate relationships, parenting experiences, and 
social interactions. In recent years, the social impact of crimi-
nal convictions has been heightened dramatically by the in-
creasing accessibility of online criminal records to the general 
public. 
1. Online Criminal Records 
Although criminal records have long been considered pub-
lic information in the United States, they did not become easily 
accessible to the general public until very recently.
90
 A criminal 
background check often required either travel to the local 
courthouse or submission of a mail request that could take days 
or weeks to process. But this changed as both public agencies 
(courts, law enforcement, and corrections) and private firms 
began aggregating and disseminating information about ar-
rests and cases online. Thus, access to criminal record infor-
mation has expanded exponentially over the last two decades. 
Today, typing a probationer’s name into a simple Google search 
will often yield everything from original “mugshot” photographs 
to detailed case information, including charges, convictions, 
and dispositions—as well as solicitations to conduct more ex-
tensive searches for a fee.  
 
of Low-Income Women, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 297, 308 (2013). 
 88. Id. at 307–08. 
 89. Id. at 308. 
 90. See Steven Raphael, Improving Employment Prospects for Former 
Prison Inmates: Challenges and Policy, in CONTROLLING CRIME: STRATEGIES 
AND TRADEOFFS 521, 521 (Philip J. Cook et al. eds., 2012); Christopher Uggen, 
The Effect of Criminal Background Checks on Hiring Ex-Offenders, 7 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL. 367, 368 (2008); Michael A. Stoll & Shawn D. 
Bushway, The Effect of Criminal Background Checks on Hiring Ex-Offenders, 
7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL. 371, 372–74 (2008); Richard Freeman, Incarcera-
tion, Criminal Background Checks, and Employment in a Low(er) Crime Socie-
ty, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL. 405, 406–07 (2008); Bruce Western, Criminal 
Background Checks and Employment Among Workers with Criminal Records, 
7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL. 413, 413–16 (2008); Uggen et al., supra note 21, 
at 628. 
2015] COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 1889 
 
The expansion of access to criminal record information has 
given birth to an entire online industry dedicated to its dissem-
ination. These sites typically publicize all information, regard-
less of whether a case was dismissed or the defendant was 
found not guilty. Mugshots.com provides the following dis-
claimer in its FAQ:  
In Criminal Law, a mugshot is a booking photograph taken during 
investigation. It isn’t an accusation nor an admission. Regardless of 
case resolution, the arrest (or other incident with the law) has hap-
pened, and a booking photograph was taken. This by itself is true and 
factual and this is what a mugshot represents. It does not represent a 
case resolution, guilty plea, or not guilty plea.
91
 
Even the simplest interaction with the justice system can 
therefore result in an indefinite, if not permanent, online post-
ing of one’s photograph and charges. 
The expressed purpose of many such websites is to protect 
public safety.
92
 In the case of a few of these websites, this may 
be their only purpose.
93
 However, most such sites also attempt 
to wring cash from their subjects, charging fees to people des-
perate to remove their records.
94
 For example, Mugshots.com 
currently charges $399 to have a mugshot removed. That fee, 
though, only pertains to removal of a single arrest record from 
 
 91. What Is a Mugshot?, MUGSHOTS, http://mugshots.com/faq.html (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2014). 
 92. Mugshots.com Is a “Google for Mugshots,” MUGSHOTS, http:// 
www.mugshots.com/faq (last visited Mar. 31, 2015). Mugshots.com character-
izes itself as  
a search engine for Official Law Enforcement records, specifically 
booking photographs, mugshots. Originally collected and distributed 
by Law Enforcement agencies, Booking [sic] records are considered 
and legally recognized as public records, in the public domain. 
Mugshots.com reproduces and republishes these Official Records in 
their original form (“as is”) under the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, the freedom to publish true and factual infor-
mation. 
Id.  
 93. See, e.g., Have a Question?, BUSTED MUGSHOTS, http://www 
.bustedmugshots.com/contact (last visited Mar. 31, 2015) (offering to consider 
removal in cases of “expunged, restricted, sealed or deceased cases”). But see 
Free Opt-Out, JAILBASE, http://www.jailbase.com/en/about/#freeoptout (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2015), for an online database of criminal record information 
that is an outlier among these types of websites. It offers free removal of crim-
inal record information, stating, “JailBase provides a free opt-out for individu-
als who do not want their arrest information posted on our site. The opt-out 
goes into affect [sic] 30 days from the request. We feel this balances the need 
for timely public arrest information and the needs of those arrested.” Id.  
 94. See Sarah Lageson, The Enduring Effects of Online Mug Shots, 
SOCIETY PAGES (May 19, 2014), http://thesocietypages.org/roundtables/ 
mugshots; see also Lashaway v. D’Antonio III, No. 3:13-cv-01733 (N.D. Ohio 
2013) (naming JustMugShots.com as defendant). 
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that particular website; in order to remove one’s complete crim-
inal record from multiple websites, one would either have to 
pay hundreds of dollars to each site or pay thousands of dollars 
to an online reputation management firm. Even then, it is quite 
likely that the information would resurface again on a different 
site. Moreover, some mugshot sites go well beyond the ostensi-
ble ‘public safety’ purpose—identifying individuals as “hotties,” 
“hunks,” or “bad babes,” or ridiculing them with “Darwin 
awards.”
95
 Such characterizations are clearly designed to objec-
tify, dehumanize, and humiliate people for commercial purpos-
es. Importantly, these websites are not held to any standards of 
accuracy; therefore, they will charge even to remove mistaken 
or erroneous information.
96
 
2. Relationships 
The widespread availability of online records also brings 
informal social consequences. Online arrest or conviction rec-
ords brand people as criminals throughout their supervision 
and into perpetuity. The disruptive effects of these online rec-
ords are difficult to quantify because they are so diverse and 
pervasive. For example, searching online for information about 
current or potential romantic partners is now a common dating 
practice. One recent survey reported that 47% of single daters 
research their dates online.
97
 In this context, a criminal record 
can have the same initial disqualifying effect as it does in the 
employment or education context by limiting the pool of poten-
tial partners. This practice similarly pertains to potential 
friends, colleagues, and acquaintances. The parents of a child’s 
play-date, for example, may become apprehensive about allow-
ing their child to be supervised by a parent with a criminal rec-
ord. In short, individuals with criminal records are increasingly 
 
 95. Avi Steinberg, Hotties, Hunks, Beat up, Celebrities: The Allure of the 
Mug Shot, THE NEW YORKER (June 13, 2012), http://www.newyorker 
.com/culture/culture-desk/hotties-hunks-beat-up-celebrities-the-allure-of-the-
mug-shot. 
 96. Each site has different policies, but this “disclaimer of warranties” 
provided by Mugshots.com (and its affiliate, UnpublishArrest.com) is typical: 
“UnpublishArrest.com does not warrant or make any representations concern-
ing the accuracy, likely results, or reliability of the use of services or Content 
on its Website or on any sites linked to this site.” Terms of Service and Use, 
UNPUBLISHED ARREST, http://unpublishedarrest.com/terms-of-service (last vis-
ited Mar. 31, 2015). These terms of service go on to note that Mugshots.com 
may provide a “courtesy removal” for sealed or expunged records—but only 
after applicants pay a “document verification” fee of $199 per arrest. Id. 
 97. Singles in America: First Dates, MATCH (2014), http://blog.match 
.com/singlesinamerica/first-dates (last visited Mar. 31, 2015). 
2015] COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 1891 
 
socially isolated by virtue of their records.  
While we all have a keen interest in learning the past be-
havior or our potential intimate partners, such knowledge may 
come at a steep societal cost. A convincing line of criminological 
research shows that lack stable and supportive family relation-
ships is closely tied to future criminality.
98
 To the extent that 
online searches stoke or exaggerate fear of people with records, 
they may thus contribute to probation and parole failure, as 
well as greater crime and recidivism. 
3. Parenting 
A criminal record can similarly become an obstacle to good 
parenting. For example, many U.S. school districts restrict par-
ents with criminal records from volunteering at a child’s school 
for various types of events, such as chaperoning field trips.
99
 In 
some cases, parents are denied regardless of the length of time 
since the offense or whether the parent was a juvenile at the 
time of the offense.
100
 Recently a parent in Tuscola County, 
Michigan applied to volunteer as a chaperone for his seven-
year-old son’s field trip, but was denied because of the felony 
breaking and entering conviction he received when he was sev-
enteen—almost twenty years prior.
101
 Although this parent 
found support from some of the other parents, several felt the 
 
 98. See, e.g., Ryan King et al., The Context of Marriage and Crime: Gen-
der, the Propensity To Marry, and Offending in Early Adulthood, 45 
CRIMINOLOGY 33, 55–59 (2007); LAUB & SAMPSON, supra note 6; Bill McCarthy 
& Teresa Casey, Love, Sex and Crime: Adolescent Romantic Relationships and 
Offending, 73 AM. SOC. REV. 944, 944–46 (2008). 
 99. News reports of parents being denied volunteering opportunities indi-
cate that even these bans are rarely spelled out in policy, they become de facto 
bans in practice. Some districts ban some or all felons outright. See Devin 
Katayama, JCPS Background Checks Block Parents from Volunteering, Even 
for Years-Old Offenses, WFPL NEWS (Aug. 25, 2013), http://wfpl.org/jcps 
-background-checks-block-parents-volunteering-even-years-old-offenses; Ga-
brielle Russon, Criminal Past Could Keep Parents from Volunteering at Sara-
sota Schools, HERALD-TRIBUNE (Sep. 2, 2014), http://www.heraldtribune 
.com/article/20140902/ARTICLE/140909932; Samantha Allen, Despite Plead-
ing with Board, Mom with Felony Can’t Volunteer at Son’s School in Farming-
ton, FOSTER’S DAILY DEMOCRAT (May 18, 2012), http://www.fosters.com/ 
apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20120518/GJNEWS_ 01/705189909; Monica Scott, 
Parents with Criminal Records, ACLU Lobby Grand Rapids School Board 
Again To Change Its Volunteer Policy, MLIVE (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www 
.mlive.com/news/grand-rapids/index.ssf/2011/09/parents_with_criminal_ 
records.html. 
 100. See Katayama, supra note 99; James Felton, School to Ex-Con Dad: 
No, You Can’t Be a Chaperone, WNEM (May 10, 2012), http://www.wnem 
.com/story/18274487/school-to-ex-con-dad-no-you-cant-be-a-chaperone. 
 101. Felton, supra note 100.  
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ban was justified. One of those parents was quoted saying, “I 
wouldn’t want my child around him. It would depend on what 
they’re convicted of, but if they’re a felon, they don’t need to be 
around kids like that.”
102
 Parents are often similarly barred 
from extracurricular activities outside of school, including 
youth coaching.
103
 
The more direct consequences of a criminal record, and es-
pecially incarceration, are decidedly more severe and damag-
ing. More than half of all incarcerated men and women are 
parents.
104
 The mere fact of parental incarceration, which nec-
essarily separates the parent from the child for some period of 
time, has detrimental effects on children. The American Bar 
Foundation and National Science Foundation convened a 2013 
White House workshop to review research on the collateral 
costs of parental incarceration on children.
105
 On average, prob-
lems in school, the home, and involvement in criminal behavior 
all increase when a parent is or has been incarcerated.
106
 
The consequences of parental incarceration are lasting and 
intergenerational, reaching well beyond incarcerated individu-
als to affect their children and communities. 
In many cases, loss of parental involvement does not end 
with incarceration. Parolees and others with criminal records 
face the possibility of losing custody of their children and/or 
having their parental rights terminated by the state. In many 
states, incarceration alone is grounds for termination of paren-
tal rights, while other states consider incarceration as a salient 
factor in assessing parental rights.
107
 Even in the absence of in-
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Jeff DiVeronica, Youth Sports Making Background Checks Priority for 
Coaches, DEMOCRAT & CHRONICLE (May 7, 2012), http://roc 
.democratandchronicle.com/article/20120507/SPORTS/305070017/Youth 
-sports-making-background-checks-priority-coaches. 
 104. LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR MINOR 
CHILDREN 1 (2010), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pptmc.pdf. 
The Bureau of Justice Statistics found that 52% of state inmates and 63% of 
federal inmates had minor children, accounting for approximately 2.3% of 
children in the United States. Id.  
 105. For a review of conference presentations, see Christopher Uggen & 
Suzy McElrath, Parental Incarceration: What We Know and Where We Need 
To Go, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 597 (2014). For an excellent empirical 
treatment of the issue, see Sara Wakefield & Chris Wildeman, Mass Impris-
onment and Racial Disparities in Childhood Behavioral Problems, 10 CRIM. & 
PUB. POLICY 793, 806 (2011). 
 106. Id. 
 107. See generally CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, U.S. 
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF 
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carceration, a criminal conviction can be grounds for terminat-
ing parental rights in some state jurisdictions.
108
 For example, a 
parent’s rights in Georgia can be terminated following a convic-
tion if the parent’s conviction “has a demonstrable effect on the 
quality of the parent-child relationship.”
109
 
Criminal convictions are also admissible in custody hear-
ings, which often pivot on determinations of the best interests 
of the child.
110
 To be sure, a history of convictions affecting the 
parent’s ability to care for the child, such as convictions for 
physical abuse, must be considered seriously in a custody hear-
ing. Nevertheless, many family courts also consider convictions 
unrelated to the care of the child. As one legal scholar argues, 
“The parent is denied custody, not because he or she mistreated 
the child, but because the parent is the ‘sort of person’ who 
might.”
111
 Here too, criminal stigma may supersede all other 
criteria to become the overriding determinant of such decisions. 
This is also the case for people with criminal records who 
wish to adopt or foster a child. Every U.S. state requires a crim-
inal background check for potential adoptive or foster par-
ents.
112
 Though not all criminal convictions automatically dis-
qualify prospective parents, by federal law the parent(s) will be 
denied if any adult living in the household has ever been con-
victed of crimes against a child, child abuse, neglect, or a crime 
involving violence.
113
 Further, households with an adult mem-
ber who has been convicted of a felony crime of physical as-
sault, battery, or a drug offense in the past five years will also 
be rejected.
114
 Such restrictions can also separate siblings. For 
 
PARENTAL RIGHTS (Jan. 2013), available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/ 
pubPDFs/groundtermin.pdf (detailing grounds for the termination of a par-
ental rights). 
 108. Peter D. Schneider, Criminal Convictions, Incarceration, and Child 
Welfare: Ex-Offenders Lose Their Children, in EVERY DOOR CLOSED: BARRIERS 
FACING PARENTS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 53, 56 (Ctr. for Law and Soc. Policy 
and Cmty. Legal Servs., Inc. eds., 2002). 
 109. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(B)(iii)(2010). 
 110. Tamar Lerer, Sentencing the Family: Recognizing the Needs of De-
pendent Children in the Administration of the Criminal Justice System, 9 NW. 
J. OF L. & SOC. POL’Y 24, 37 (2013). 
 111. Deborah Ahrens, Not in Front of the Children: Prohibition on Child 
Custody As Civil Branding for Criminal Activity, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 737, 774 
(2000). 
 112. CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, U.S. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, 
CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR PROSPECTIVE FOSTER AND ADOPTIVE 
PARENTS 3 (2011), available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/ 
background.pdf. 
 113. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(20)(B)(i) (2012). 
 114. See id. § 671(a)(20)(A)(ii).  
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example, if a child in foster care is involved in a fight and ar-
rested for assault, his brother or sister may be barred from re-
siding in the same foster care home.
115
 In such cases, one sibling 
could be considered dangerous and the other a vulnerable per-
son.  
Finally, courts in at least two states have upheld draconian 
restrictions on procreation as a condition of probation. Bans on 
procreation as a condition of probation had long been struck 
down by the courts, but that changed with a pair of recent cas-
es in Oregon and Wisconsin.
116
 In Oregon, a man convicted of 
criminal mistreatment was required, as a condition of his pro-
bation, to complete drug treatment and anger management be-
fore he had any more children.
117
 He appealed, arguing that 
banning him from having children was a violation of his consti-
tutional rights.
118
 The Oregon Court of Appeals rejected his ap-
peal, ruling that because the court could later modify the condi-
tion, it was not a “total ban.”
119
 A few years later, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court upheld a similar ban in the case of a father of 
nine children in Wisconsin who was convicted of not paying 
child support.
120
  
C. PHYSICAL CONSEQUENCES 
Criminal convictions also influence one’s physical location 
and well-being. Formal and informal restrictions often limit 
housing options, freedom of movement, and immigration sta-
tus, while compromising physical and mental health. 
1. Housing 
In his famous 1996 State of the Union speech, President 
Bill Clinton challenged housing authorities and tenant associa-
tions throughout the nation to rid themselves of “criminal gang 
 
 115. CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, U.S. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, 
SIBLING ISSUES IN FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION 11 (2013), available at 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/siblingissues.pdf. 
 116. Joanna Nairn, Is There a Right To Have Children? Substantive Due 
Process and Probation Conditions That Restrict Reproductive Rights, 6 STAN. 
J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 7–8 (2010). 
 117. State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697, 698 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). 
 118. Id. at 699. 
 119. Id. 
 120. State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Wis. 2001). The defendant was 
sentenced to three years in prison followed by five years of probation, wherein 
he was prohibited from having more children until he could show that he was 
able to provide financial support for the children he already had and any fu-
ture children. Id.  
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members and drug dealers.”
121
 He urged that “the rule for resi-
dents who commit crime and peddle drugs should be one strike 
and you’re out.” While providing safe living arrangements for 
public housing tenants is certainly a worthy goal, such state-
ments and resulting policies exacerbated housing problems for 
people with criminal records. A combination of formal and in-
formal consequences sharply curtails the availability of safe 
and adequate housing options for those under community su-
pervision. 
U.S. federal housing policy has prohibited people convicted 
of felonies and certain other crimes from receiving subsidized 
housing since 1987.
122
 The “one strike and you’re out” policy, 
signed into law in March 1996, reiterated the prohibition of 
convicted persons and provided a legal basis to evict not only 
the person committing the crime, but every member of the 
household as well—regardless of their level or lack of involve-
ment in the crime.
123
 When this policy was challenged constitu-
tionally, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed its legality, and it 
remains in force today.
124
  
Public housing assistance only makes up a small share of 
the overall rental housing market.
125
 But as is the case in many 
 
 121. Clinton State of the Union, supra note 24. 
 122. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 1437(d)(I)(4)(A)(ii) (2012). 
 123. Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1437(d)(I)(6) (2012). 
 124. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130 (2002). The 
Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and 
Acting Assistant Secretary for Housing did provide guidance in a letter to 
HUD owners and agents. “The Department is asking owners of HUD-assisted 
properties to seek a balance between allowing ex-offenders to reunite with 
families that live in HUD subsidized housing, and ensuring the safety of all 
residents of its programs. Accordingly, the Department encourages owners of 
HUD-assisted properties to develop policies and procedures that allow ex-
offenders to rejoin the community to the extent that this balance can be main-
tained.” Letter from Shaun Donovan, Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban 
Dev’t, & Carol J. Galante, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Hous. for U.S. Dep’t of 
Hous. & Urban Dev’t, to Owners and Agents of HUD-Assisted Prop. (Mar. 14, 
2012), available at http://www.ahscohio.org/UserFiles/Documents/All% 
20States/MFamily%20properties_Re%20entry%20of%20Ex-offenders% 
20memo.pdf; see also Letter from Shaun Donovan, Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Hous. 
& Urban Dev., & Carol J. Galante, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Hous. for U.S. 
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., to Publ. Hous. Auth. (PHAs) Exec. Dirs. (June 
17, 2011), available at http://www.fhcmichigan.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/ 
06/Rentry-letter-from-Donovan-to-PHAs-6-17-11.pdf. 
 125. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., AMERICA’S 
RENTAL HOUSING: EVOLVING MARKETS AND NEEDS 3 (2013), available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/jchs_americas_rental_
housing_2013_1_0.pdf. The Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard Uni-
versity estimates that renters receiving some type of government housing as-
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industries, the private sector tends to follow the government’s 
lead. A 2005 survey conducted by one of the three main profes-
sional associations for rental housing found that eighty percent 
of its members screened applicants for criminal records.
126
 Alt-
hough the respondents in the aforementioned survey were 
mainly large property owners, David Thacher points out that 
the three best-selling landlord “how-to” books for small proper-
ty owners all discussed criminal background checks and includ-
ed criminal history questions in their sample rental applica-
tions.
127
 In fact, in his sample of twenty such “how-to” books 
(ten published before 1990 and ten published after), Thacher 
found that all of the post-1990 books discussed criminal records 
while none of the pre-1990 books did so.
128
 Recall that federal 
policy began barring felons from federal housing assistance in 
1987. 
There is little firm evidence regarding how these policies 
affect housing opportunities for probationers, parolees, and 
former felons. In our experience, however, they impose signifi-
cant barriers to finding safe and suitable housing. For example, 
Valerie
129
 recently moved to Minneapolis to enter a Ph.D. pro-
gram. Prior to this, she lived on the east coast, where she had 
completed a master’s degree while working two jobs and volun-
teering at a nonprofit organization. She was also an ex-felon, 
having been convicted of two low-level felony drug charges al-
most ten years prior, for which she served less than a year in 
prison. She told us, “I didn’t realize my record was going to be a 
problem when I started looking for housing, so I didn’t think 
much of it.” She quickly realized, though, that it would be a 
major problem in Minnesota; every rental application she came 
 
sistance made up just over 11% of the rental housing market. Of those receiv-
ing assistance, 2.2 million utilized housing vouchers, 1.3 million used subsi-
dies tied to privately owned units (e.g., Section 8 housing), 1.1 million lived in 
housing owned and operated by public housing authorities, and approximately 
270,000 were beneficiaries of a housing program run by the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, Office of Rural Development. 
 126. As quoted in David Thacher, The Rise of Criminal Background Screen-
ing in Rental Housing, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 12 (2008). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 18. Thacher also provides a rich legal history that traces the 
changes in premises liability law, state statutes, and the law enforcement–led 
“landlord training programs” over time to the current state of affairs. Id. at 16. 
In sum, “law and government have moved on several fronts over the past three 
decades to make tenants’ criminal behavior part of the risk calculation that 
landlords must consider.” Id. at 18. 
 129. E-mail from Valerie to Robert Austin Stewart, Ph.D. Student, Dep’t of 
Sociology, Univ. of Minn. (Oct. 1, 2014) (on file with author). Valerie is a pseu-
donym to protect the student’s identity. 
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across required a criminal background check. For this reason, 
she called more than two-dozen lease offices and apartment 
managers. Each of the nine managers with whom she spoke 
told her that their criteria were either “no felonies” or “at least 
ten years incarceration-free.” She left messages with her in-
quiry and her contact information at the offices that did not an-
swer, but they never returned her call. Eventually she was able 
to find a manager who was willing to rent to her, but not with-
out a significant amount of searching and stress. 
As Thacher put it, “from the perspective of ex-convicts 
themselves, landlord screening is an especially significant form 
of institutional exclusion because housing (along with employ-
ment) ranks as one of the most important needs it impinges 
upon.”
130
 Coupled with the other barriers to employment and 
social interaction, these blanket prohibitions serve to make re-
integration and reentry more challenging for probationers and 
parolees.
131
 
2. Movement 
In addition to influencing housing options, a criminal rec-
ord also imposes other geographic restrictions, generally by 
prohibiting one from entering or leaving certain spaces. These 
can take several forms, but we here address a few of the most 
prevalent. 
First, certain types of offenses or designations can trigger 
spatial exclusion from areas near schools or other specifically 
designated areas. Scholars have noted the rapid growth of spa-
tial exclusion, or “banishment,” as a tool of social control and 
another layer of punishment.
132
 For example, as a condition of 
probation or release, individuals convicted of a variety of of-
fenses can be restricted from designated geographic areas, such 
as “drug-free zones” or “prostitution-free zones.”
133
 Entering 
these zones for any reason can result in a violation of supervi-
sion, incarceration, or other sanctions.
134
 
 
 130. Thacher, supra note 126. 
 131. Rue Landau, Criminal Records and Subsidized Housing: Families 
Losing the Opportunity for Decent Shelter, in EVERY DOOR CLOSED, supra note 
108, at 51. 
 132. KATHERINE BECKETT & STEVE HERBERT, BANISHED: THE NEW SOCIAL 
CONTROL IN URBAN AMERICA 6–9 (2009); Katherine Beckett & Steve Herbert, 
Penal Boundaries: Banishment and the Expansion of Punishment, 35 L. & 
SOC. INQUIRY 1, 2–3 (2010) [hereinafter Beckett & Herbert, Penal Bounda-
ries]. 
 133. Beckett & Herbert, Penal Boundaries, supra note 132, at 9. 
 134. Id. 
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Individuals subject to predatory or sex offender designa-
tions face similar geographic restrictions. In most jurisdictions, 
they are barred from living in or near “child gathering places,” 
such as schools, parks, playgrounds, bus stops, or childcare 
providers.
135
 In some locales, these zones can range up to 2,000 
feet, or more than one-third of a mile.
136
 These restrictions dras-
tically limit where such offenders can find housing. For exam-
ple, Orange County, Florida has restriction zones within 1,000 
feet of places where children gather (attractions, bus stops, 
daycares, parks, and schools).
137
 As a result, sex offenders are 
restricted from living in 95.2% of residential areas in Orange 
County.
138
 Elsewhere in Florida, Pastor Dick Witherow estab-
lished “Miracle Village” as a religious community that is home 
to over one-hundred registered sex offenders who could not oth-
erwise find housing.
139
 Despite such extreme social isolation, a 
study by the Minnesota Department of Corrections found no re-
lation between residency location and sex offense recidivism.
140
 
Spatial exclusion also occurs on an even grander scale in 
regard to international travel. Several nations prohibit individ-
uals with criminal records and those on community supervision 
from entering.
141
 For example, Canada deems travelers who 
were convicted of offenses in other countries that would be 
criminal offenses in Canada inadmissible.
142
 Similar re-
strictions are placed on travel to the United Kingdom and Aus-
tralia.
143
  
 
 135. Richard Tewksbury, Exile at Home: The Unintended Collateral Conse-
quences of Sex Offender Residency Restrictions, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
531, 537 (2007). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Paul A. Zandbergen & Timothy C. Hart, Residential Housing Options 
for Convicted Sex Offenders: Investigating the Impact of Residency Restriction 
Laws Using GIS, 8 JUST. RES. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2006); Jill S. Levenson & Andrea 
L. Hern, Sex Offender Residence Restrictions: Unintended Consequences and 
Community Reentry, 59 JUST. RES. & POL’Y 59, 63 (2007). 
 138. Zandbergen & Hart, supra note 137.  
 139. Lisa F. Jackson & David Feige, Sex Offender Village, N.Y. TIMES (May 
21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/22/opinion/sex-offender-village 
.html. 
 140. Grant Duwe et al., Does Residential Proximity Matter? A Geographic 
Analysis of Sex Offense Recidivism, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 484, 500–01 
(2008). 
 141. See infra notes 142–44 and accompanying text.   
 142. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 36 (Can.); 
see also Reasons for Inadmissibility, GOV’T CAN. (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.cic 
.gc.ca/english/information/inadmissibility/who.asp. 
 143. Immigration Rules, Part 9 § 322(5) (U.K.); Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 
501(6) (Austl.). Conversely, nearly every member of the European Union par-
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In addition to spatial exclusion, a second form of movement 
restriction affects noncitizens. Immigrants with criminal rec-
ords are subject to detention and deportation following any in-
teraction with the criminal justice system. As an illustration of 
how precarious life can be for noncitizens with criminal records, 
consider the case of Alex,
144
 a Mexican immigrant, as described 
to us by his pro bono immigration attorney in Minneapolis. 
Alex came to the United States illegally in the 1980s with 
his parents, who were later granted amnesty. Alex eventually 
obtained a green card by virtue of his mother’s status. As a re-
sult of a relationship with a 13-year-old when he was 16, Alex 
was convicted of statutory rape and required to register as a 
sex offender. When he was 23, he met his partner, Rosa,
145
 and 
they have three children together and own their own home. 
Their children are U.S. citizens. 
Since his juvenile felony, Alex has had three convictions on 
his record: (1) a gross misdemeanor for giving false infor-
mation; (2) a gross misdemeanor for solicitation; and, (3) a fail-
ure to register in 2007. The failure to register charge was a re-
sult of forgetting to update his address with probation 
authorities, which occurred more than fifteen years after his 
sex offense conviction. He had not had any further arrests, 
charges, convictions or even minor driving infractions since 
2007. In 2014, an officer with Immigration and Customs En-
forcement (ICE) ran an old warrant search for Minnesota and 
came across a 2007 warrant that was briefly active for Alex’s 
failure to register charge.
146
 The ICE official then ran a thor-
ough background check and found his other convictions. As a 
result, ICE officers came to his home as he was leaving for 
work, arrested him, and brought him to a detention facility 
where he was processed and charged with having two crimes 
 
ticipates in the Schengen Borders Code agreement which opens internal bor-
ders between member countries and sets immigration practices for external 
borders, and there is no criminal record restriction for these countries. See 
Regulation 562/2006, 2006 O.J. (EC) (establishing a Community Code on the 
rules governing the movement of persons across borders called the Schengen 
Borders Code). 
 144. E-mail from Alex’s Immigration Attorney to Robert Austin Stewart, 
Ph.D. Student, Dep’t of Sociology, Univ. of Minn. (Oct. 2, 2014) (on file with 
author). To protect the identity and confidentiality of the client, “Alex” was 
chosen as a pseudonym, and the identity of his attorney shall remain confiden-
tial. Minor details of his case were slightly altered to protect his identity.  
 145. This is also a pseudonym to protect the identity of the client’s partner. 
 146. See Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and “Aliens”: Privacy Expectations and 
the Immigration Raids, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081, 1096–1121 (2008) (ex-
plaining an in-depth study of ICE’s practice of searching old warrants). 
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involving moral turpitude. He was in danger of indefinite de-
tention and deportation, but his attorney was able to convince 
ICE to agree to cancel his removal. Others who lacked experi-
enced representation have not been so lucky. Nevertheless, 
Alex was detained for two months, which caused significant fi-
nancial strain for his family, as he was the sole provider but 
could not work while in detention. 
3. Health 
Collateral consequences of a conviction are also manifest in 
tangible physical health effects. The first and most obvious con-
sequence extends from the difficulty of finding stable and 
worthwhile employment as discussed above. Healthcare access 
in the United States is strongly interwoven with employment 
and associated benefits, so a lack of stable employment dramat-
ically constrains healthcare choices.
147
 Moreover, individuals 
who are not employed or who lack the means to purchase 
healthcare on the private market turn to public assistance for 
healthcare.
148
 As noted above, however, restrictions on public 
benefits for individuals with records can stand in the way of 
quality or regular care. 
Beyond a lack of available health care, mere contact with 
the criminal justice system can have detrimental long-term 
health effects. Short-term health actually tends to improve dur-
ing spells of incarceration, as many inmates lacked adequate 
care before incarceration.
149
 Nonetheless, these improvements 
are not long-lasting and largely dissipate following release.
150
 In 
fact, compared to the general public, people who have spent any 
time in the prison system are more likely to have major health 
issues later in life—a finding that holds even in the most rigor-
ously designed investigations.
151
 Specifically, midlife health 
functioning is significantly worsened by prior exposure to in-
 
 147. Congress passed healthcare reform in 2010 that mandated employers 
with more than fifty employees to offer health insurance to offer their full-time 
employees. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 148. See David Dooley, Jonathan Fielding, & Lennart Levi, Health and 
Unemployment, 17 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 449, 459 (1996). 
 149. See Jason Schnittker et al., Incarceration and the Health of the Afri-
can American Community, 8 DU BOIS REV.: SOC. SCI. RES. ON RACE 133, 135 
(2011). 
 150. Jason Schnittker & Andrea John, Enduring Stigma: The Long-Term 
Effects of Incarceration on Health, 48 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 115, 123 
(2007). 
 151. Id. 
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carceration.
152
 Furthermore, formerly incarcerated individuals 
appear to suffer disproportionately from depression, infectious 
diseases, and stress-related ailments.
153
 
D. CIVIL CONSEQUENCES 
People convicted of crime, particularly felony-level offenses, 
also incur collateral consequences that restrict or prohibit myr-
iad forms of civic participation. These sanctions vary from state 
to state, but they include restrictions on participating in elec-
tions, serving on juries, owning firearms, and joining the mili-
tary.
154
 Some of these consequences, such as voting, are tempo-
rary in some states and permanent in others.
155
 But in the case 
of the other restrictions, such as some types of military service, 
the restriction is generally permanent.
156
 
1. Voting 
The right to vote is perhaps the most visible and most di-
rect symbol of civic inclusion in a democratic society.
157
 Stand-
ing shoulder to shoulder with fellow citizens and participating 
in the electoral process also encourages identification with the 
 
 152. Michael Massoglia, Incarceration, Health, and Racial Disparities in 
Health, 42 LAW. & SOC’Y. REV. 275, 277 (2008). 
 153. Michael Massoglia, Incarceration As Exposure: The Prison, Infectious 
Disease, and Other Stress-Related Illnesses, 49 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 56, 
65 (2008); see also Schnittker & John, supra note 150, at 126; Jason Schnittker 
et al., Out and Down: Incarceration and Psychiatric Disorders, 53 J. HEALTH & 
SOC. BEHAV. 448, 458 (2012).  
 154. Ewald & Uggen, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
 155. See JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 84–89 (2006) (finding that 
even states with procedures for restoring voting rights actually restore very 
few). As discussed below, Maine and Vermont currently have no felon voting 
restriction; Illinois and 12 other states restrict voting for current prison in-
mates; California and 4 other states additionally disenfranchise parolees; 
Minnesota and 18 other states additionally disenfranchise probationers; and, 
Florida and 10 other states additionally disenfranchise many former felons 
who have completed their sentences and are no longer under correctional su-
pervision. See CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF 
FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010, at 3, tbl.1 (The 
Sentencing Project ed., 2012), available at http://sentencingproject.org/ 
doc/publications/fd_state_level_estimates_of_felon_disen_2010.pdf. 
 156. See Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and 
the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585, 586–87 (2006); see also Ewald & Uggen, 
supra note 1, at 3 (stating that the restriction has been lifted in times of war 
with special permission).  
 157. See generally Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, 
Criminality, and “The Purity of the Ballot Box,” 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300, 1309 
(1989) (discussing how “political participation is the path to moral growth”). 
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norms and values of a community.
158
 As Adam Winkler put it, 
voting is a “meaningful participatory act through which indi-
viduals create and affirm their membership in the community 
and thereby transform their identities both as individuals and 
as part of a greater collectivity.”
159
 Moreover, there is a robust 
negative correlation between voting and subsequent recidivism, 
suggesting that the prosocial nature of voting may contribute to 
the civic reintegration of current and former felons.
160
  
Oregon is one state that permits probationers and parolees 
to vote.
161
 Uggen and Inderbitzin “matched Oregon voting and 
crime records and found that probationers and parolees who 
exercise their right to vote have significantly lower recidivism 
rates than those who do not.”
162
 As shown in Figure 3, the pa-
role failure rate was 26.1% for non-voters and 19.3% for vot-
ers.
163
 “Oregon is an unusual case in that all voting is done by 
mail; as such, the effect of civic participation may be even 
stronger in states where voting is a more visible community 
event and neighbors come together at the polls on election 
day.”
164
  
 
 158. Christopher Uggen et al., ‘Less than the Average Citizen’: Stigma, Role 
Transition and the Civic Reintegration of Convicted Felons, in AFTER CRIME 
AND PUNISHMENT: PATHWAYS TO OFFENDER REINTEGRATION 261, 277–79 
(Shadd Maruna & Russ Immarigeon eds., 2004). 
 159. Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330, 331 
(1993). 
 160. See Uggen et al., supra note 158, at 277–79 for interviews with cur-
rent and former felons about perspectives on voting and see Christopher 
Uggen & Jeff Manza, Voting and Subsequent Crime and Arrest: Evidence from 
a Community Sample, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 193, 196–200, 213 (2004), 
for empirical support for a relationship between voting and desistance from 
crime. 
 161. Christopher Uggen & Michelle Inderbitzen, The Price and the Promise 
of Citizenship: Extending the Vote to Non-incarcerated Felons, in 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY 63 (Natasha A. Frost et 
al. eds., 2010). 
 162. Id.  
 163. Id. at 64 fig.3. 
 164. Id. at 63. 
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Figure 3: Probationers and Parolees Who Vote In Oregon 
Have Significantly Lower Recidivism Rates than Those Who Do 
Not Vote 
 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court clearly identifies disenfranchise-
ment as a “nonpenal exercise of the power to regulate the fran-
chise” rather than punishment.
165
 Regardless of whether disen-
franchisement is directly punitive or a collateral consequence, 
its effects are widespread and well-established. Our most re-
cent estimates put the number of persons disenfranchised for 
criminal convictions at approximately 5.85 million, or one in 
forty American adults.
166
 Disenfranchisement laws vary from 
state to state, though all but two states (Maine and Vermont) 
disenfranchise felons for at least some period of time following 
a conviction.
167
 Of the remaining states, thirteen restrict cur-
rently incarcerated individuals from voting, an additional five 
restrict parolees, and an additional nineteen also restrict pro-
bationers.
168
 Eleven states continue to restrict the right to vote 
 
 165. Green v. Bd. of Elections of New York, 380 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 
1967) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 97 (1958) (plurality opinion)), quot-
ed in Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disen-
franchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1058 (2002). 
 166. UGGEN ET AL., supra note 155. 
 167. See id. at 3, tbl.1.  
 168. See id. 
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even after individuals complete their sentences
169
—in some cas-
es for life.
170
 
Our interviews with disenfranchised probationers and pa-
rolees confirmed how the practice conveys a message of exclu-
sion and reaffirms one’s outsider status. Several respondents 
characterized voting as a “part of being a citizen and being an 
adult.”
171
 In particular, one stated, 
People don’t want to recognize that we can still be citizens and still be 
patriotic even though we made a mistake . . . . I can’t say anything 
because I don’t have a voice. Or ‘cause I can’t vote about it . . . . How 
can you feel that you’re giving back to a community that you’re a part 
of when you’re exiled from it by not being able to vote and have a 
voice in it?
172
 
In other words, not being able to vote seemed to diminish 
or hinder reintegration efforts. Some of our interview partici-
pants characterized disenfranchisement as just one more way 
for the community to remind them of their outsider status: 
 [I] would like to someday feel like a, quote, “normal citizen,” a con-
tributing member of society, and you know that’s hard when every 
election you’re constantly being reminded, “Oh yeah, that’s right, I’m 
ashamed.”. . . . It’s just like a little salt in the wound . . . . It’s just loss 
after loss after loss. And this is just another one. Another to add to 
the pile. . . .
173
 
As with other collateral sanctions, many of those directly 
affected by disenfranchisement experience the practice as dra-
conian and purely punitive.
174
 These feelings have been echoed 
by judges and other officials. In an opinion involving a voting 
ban for certain misdemeanants, one federal judge called disen-
franchisement “the harshest civil sanction imposed by a demo-
cratic society, . . . [T]he disenfranchised is severed from the 
body politic and condemned to the lowest form of citizenship.”
175
 
He also condemned policies that broadly applied voting re-
strictions: “Such a shadowy form of citizenship must not be im-
posed lightly; rather, only when the circumstances and the law 
 
 169. See id. at 3. 
 170. MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 155, at 84–89 (describing the low rate of 
restored voting rights). 
 171. See Uggen et al., supra note 158, at 278 (interview with a 38-year-old 
incarcerated woman). 
 172. See id. at 278 (emphasis removed) (interview with a 37-year-old incar-
cerated man).  
 173. See id. at 277–78 (emphasis removed) (interview with a 49-year-old 
incarcerated woman). 
 174. Id. at 278 (quoting a 37-year-old inmate who described 
disenfranchisement as a lifelong punishment). 
 175. McLaughlin v. City of Canton, 947 F. Supp. 954, 971 (S.D. Miss. 
1995). 
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clearly direct.”
176
 However, voting restrictions, in most jurisdic-
tions, are blanket prohibitions that are applied automatically 
rather than imposed in a targeted or deliberate manner.
177
 
2. Juries 
Voting is perhaps the most visible barrier to civic partici-
pation, but felon jury exclusion is even more widespread than 
disenfranchisement.
178
 All but two states, Colorado and Maine, 
bar felons on probation and parole from serving on juries, and 
thirty-one states impose lifetime bans.
179
 The remaining states 
bar some or all felons for life or for some period of time, such as 
during periods of supervision.
180
 As a result, researchers esti-
mate that “13 million citizens can never participate in a jury 
and an unknown number of others are excluded for some period 
of time.”
181
 
The racial impact of civil consequences is more salient in 
some jurisdictions than others. Using census and criminal jus-
tice data, Darren Wheelock examined the racial impact of felon 
jury exclusion in Georgia.
182
 Across the state, Wheelock esti-
mated that 14% of African-American adults were prohibited 
from jury service.
183
 But when the level of analysis shifted to 
the county level, Wheelock found that more than half of the Af-
rican-American men in some counties were excluded from the 
jury selection process.
184
 In other words, the likelihood of an ac-
cused African-American male in these counties facing a jury 
that was demographically representative of the community was 
very small—with felon jury exclusions directly affecting the 
constitutionally guaranteed right to a jury of one’s peers.
185
 
 
 176. Id. Coincidentally, this is the same U.S. District Court Judge who sen-
tenced Anita McLemore to three years in prison for welfare fraud. See Taibbi, 
supra note 85. 
 177. MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 155, at 37. 
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 180. Id. 
 181. LERMAN & WEAVER, supra note 178, at 85. 
 182. See generally Wheelock, supra note 179. 
 183. Id. at 347. 
 184. Id. at 348. 
 185. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (discussing the 
fundamental importance of the right to a fair and impartial jury to guard 
against arbitrary action or prosecution in the American system of justice: “The 
framers of the constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary but in-
sisted upon further protection against arbitrary action. Providing an accused 
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3. Other Consequences 
Space limitations preclude a comprehensive discussion of 
the many other collateral consequences of criminal convictions. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note important restrictions on 
military service, holding elective office, serving in certain posi-
tions, and registration requirements.
186
  
II.  BROADER EFFECTS AND REFORM PROPOSALS   
A decent job, secure housing, stable family relationships, 
and a stake in one’s community surely rank among the strong-
est predictors of probation and parole success.
187
 Many of the 
collateral sanctions discussed in this article thus fly in the face 
of theory and research on desistance from crime. As President 
George W. Bush put it in his 2004 State of the Union Address, 
if people “can’t find work or a home or help, they are much 
more likely to commit crime and return to prison.”
188
 As early as 
1957, the National Conference on Parole called civil and politi-
cal restrictions “an archaic holdover from early times,” and 
urged their abolition.
189
 The time has surely come for a rea-
soned reassessment of the costs of broad-scope collateral sanc-
tions. 
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A. CATALOGING  
The first order of business is to continue efforts to catalog 
and classify the myriad restrictions imposed on individuals. 
With the support of the National Institute of Justice, the Amer-
ican Bar Association has dramatically advanced knowledge by 
creating and maintaining an accessible website with a list of all 
federal and state collateral consequences.
190
 To our knowledge, 
this effort has been quite effective in reaching those directly af-
fected by the sanctions, as well as practitioners and academic 
researchers with no conviction history themselves.
191
 Similarly, 
the Uniform Law Commission has offered model legislation by 
which each state could do the same.
192
  
B. NOTIFYING 
In the absence of clear and accessible jurisdiction-specific 
lists of collateral sanctions, it is unsurprising that probationers, 
parolees, and former felons remain confused about their rights 
and restrictions. A second area for reform thus concerns the 
need to apprise defendants and those leaving criminal supervi-
sion of the sanctions to which they are—or will be—subject. De-
fense attorneys are increasingly alerting clients, prosecutors, 
and judges to the costs of collateral consequences.
193
 Those 
providing such “holistic defense” have won favorable pleas and 
dismissals “when they [were] able to educate prosecutors and 
judges on the draconian hidden consequences for the clients 
and their families.”
194
 Regardless of the wishes of clients and 
defendants, however, such negotiations still depend critically 
on the responsiveness of prosecutors and judges.
195
  
 
 190. Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 42. 
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C. SUNSETTING 
A third reform proposal would routinely remove or “sunset” 
restrictions after a pre-specified period. Criminologists using 
diverse methodologies have shown that after approximately 
seven years with no new offenses, the risk of subsequent crime 
among former felons approximates that of the general popula-
tion, providing a scientific basis for time-limited collateral 
sanctions.
196
 In many jurisdictions, however, there is currently 
no mechanism to remove certain designations, let alone “sun-
set” them, relegating those convicted of sex crimes to perma-
nent and caste-like hyperstigmatization.
197
 Such work calls for 
renewed scrutiny of indefinite or permanent restrictions on 
persons with criminal records.   
D. TAILORING 
Removing a blanket ban on all felons does not preclude the 
imposition of sanctions as a condition of supervision. On the 
basis of a pre-sentence investigation, judges are well-positioned 
to identify a checklist of specific sanctions that may be imposed 
or removed at sentencing.
198
 Such considerations could be folded 
into the individual assessments of risk and dangerousness—the 
same considerations that govern decisions about whether to in-
carcerate individuals or place them on community supervision. 
Such work is a front-end sentencing analogue to the idea of 
back-end “re-entry courts,” tribunals with the authority to lift 
some or all sanctions.
199
  
E. ABOLISHING  
Reformers are also calling for the complete abolition of par-
ticular restrictions, such as felon voting bans and restrictions 
on public assistance, as well as rigorous cost-benefit analyses of 
 
 196. See Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the Pres-
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others.
200
 On the basis of this review, we would offer another 
proposal for consideration: shifting the default from sanction to 
no-sanction. Under such a system, the collateral sanction would 
be imposed for particular enumerated offenses or when other-
wise merited (e.g., imposing disenfranchisement for those with 
a history of voter fraud), but would not be routinely applied. 
F. RESTRICTING 
Most reform efforts target the formal legal consequences of 
conviction.
201
 Insofar as criminal records remain widely dissem-
inated, however, such reforms would leave the informal conse-
quences intact.
202
 Defenders of the current open-records system 
argue that “the flow of cheap information about past criminal 
behavior is not a genie that can be readily put back into Alad-
din’s lamp.”
203
 Despite potential legal and policy barriers to 
“sealing” such records, there are many good models to impose 
sensible restrictions on access to criminal history information. 
Outside the United States, access to criminal records is far 
more limited and closely guarded.
204
 Within the United States, 
other potentially stigmatizing records (such as those related to 
mental and physical health) are similarly and responsibly re-
stricted.
205
  
Many of these reform proposals are explicated in the Amer-
ican Bar Association’s Collateral Sanctions Standards.
206
 Most 
importantly, adoption of such Standards would help ensure:  
that defendants are fully aware, at the time of a guilty plea and sen-
tencing, of all relevant collateral sanctions that will automatically 
come into play as a result of a conviction; that the sentencing court 
has authority to consider applicable collateral sanctions in shaping its 
own sentence; and, that people who are subject to collateral sanctions 
have an opportunity to obtain relief from a court or an administrative 
agency.
207
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  CONCLUSION   
While we have isolated each collateral sanction for analytic 
purposes, we use the concept of “piling on” to emphasize that 
people experience them collectively—as a totalizing system that 
touches upon almost every aspect of social life. When they are 
applied deliberately and appropriately, collateral sanctions 
serve an important and necessary function in protecting public 
safety. When applied indiscriminately and unnecessarily, how-
ever, they can slow or prevent reintegration and impose great 
costs on individuals, their families, and their communities. Our 
brief survey of the collateral consequences of criminal convic-
tion suggests that we may have underestimated the costs and 
exaggerated the benefits of the broad-scope application of col-
lateral sanctions. In law as in football, “piling on” is unneces-
sary, retards our progress, and can result in serious injury. 
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